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Designing Organizations
for Exploration and
Exploitation
Timothy N. Carroll

Abstract: All organizations face the core challenge of deciding on investments in two very
different types of activities: exploration and exploitation. Exploration activities are futureoriented, such as developing new capabilities, experimenting with new technologies, and
pursuing new customers and markets. Exploitation activities, in contrast, focus on the
refinement of existing competencies, processes, and products. Because an organization’s
design should reflect its goals, it is difficult to accommodate exploration and exploitation
activities within a single organization. This article discusses four major approaches used to
tackle this problem, and notes the strengths and limitations of each approach.
Keywords: Exploration-exploitation; organizational ambidexterity; dynamic capabilities;
organization design

One of the most influential scholarly works on organizations over the last twenty years has
been James March’s “Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning” (March,
1991). Part of the article’s appeal is that it addresses a core organizational challenge – deciding
between investments in two different types of activities. Pursuing exploitation activities
implies a focus on the “refinement and extension of existing competencies, technologies and
paradigms,” while an exploration focus indicates “experimentation with new alternatives”
(March, 1991: 85). Exploitation is necessary for improving current operations, and returns
on investments in exploitation are likely to be near term and positive. Exploration is more
likely to yield the next breakthrough idea, product, or market, but returns on exploration are
less certain and more distant in time. The exploration-exploitation construct can be applied
to organizational choices related to alliances, new product development, which markets and
customers to target, and employee and organizational development.
Although exploration and exploitation are both important to organizational performance,
most organizations would like to be able to pursue each type of activity at the same time. Doing
both simultaneously, however, can be difficult. For one thing, each approach can become
self-reinforcing. Exploration, for example, is by its very nature variable and prone to failure.
When inevitable failures provoke a search for other new approaches, the organization may
fall prey to the “failure trap” – always looking for the next great thing. Such organizations pay
the costs of experimentation without gaining the benefits. Conversely, since an exploitation
approach is more likely to yield early successes, these can reinforce the pursuit of similar
efforts, creating a “success trap.” While this promotes stability, it also keeps the organization
from finding new opportunities. A second challenge is that competitive pressures may push
the organization to prioritize one area over another. Often this takes the form of a short-term
focus on exploitation rather than exploration. A third challenge to doing both simultaneously
is that resources are limited. Providing more resources in one area means that the other
area is less well resourced. Especially in situations where the need for either exploration or
exploitation seems more pressing, the lure of prioritizing one over the other may become too
great to resist. For example, many companies may be more inclined to improve on current
operations, such as looking for cost-cutting opportunities during an economic downturn.
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Similarly, exploration may seem more appealing in a new or growing market segment or
early in an industry’s life cycle. A final challenge is that the structures and processes that
promote exploration do not always facilitate exploitation. Recently, the CEO of 3M initiated
Six Sigma management techniques across the organization, aimed at improving quality and
controlling costs by reducing defects and variance in processes. While this exploitation-type
effort worked well in many areas, it did not mesh well with the research and development
function that is critical at 3M (Gunther, 2010).
How can managers design an organization that facilitates the pursuit of both exploration
and exploitation? Ideally, how can you have an organization that continually refines what
it is already doing while at the same time looking for promising new things to do? There is
an ongoing debate in the scholarly community about how organizations can achieve these
competing goals. Four main options have been suggested.

Option 1: Outsourcing
The first approach assumes that the tensions arising from trying to do both will make it too
difficult to succeed. Instead, the organization focuses on one approach and outsources the
other. For exploitation-focused firms, this means partnering or acquiring new technologies
and products as the need arises. The Intel Capital fund, for example, provides the computer
chipmaker the means to develop the market for new uses of its chips as well as provide an
opportunity to acquire emerging technologies – both exploration-focused activities. Think
also of pharmaceutical companies that in-license compounds that biotechnology firms have
discovered or developed, while they focus on manufacturing, sales, and marketing activities.
For exploration-oriented firms, this approach means focusing on the next big leaps in
technology or product design while letting other companies handle other functions. Think
here of many high-tech companies who partner with others to do contract manufacturing,
leaving them to concentrate on product development. Indeed, you could view contract
manufacturers as exploitation-focused firms who outsource exploration.
From an organization design standpoint, this approach is straightforward. You can design
your organization with a clear focus. What this approach lacks is integration. It is critical to
have a strong capability in managing the integration with the partner firms. For example, who
chooses which new technologies to license or acquire? How are alliances managed within the
organizational hierarchy? Which parts of the business are most dependent on these partners,
and how integrated do they need to be? Is an acquisition kept autonomous or reconfigured
within existing divisions? Without an integration capability, the success and failure traps
mentioned earlier can lead to eventual obsolescence for exploitation-focused firms, or never
profiting from the new options generated by an exploration-focused company.

Option 2: Separate Exploration and
Exploitation, but Align Them
The need to integrate across the two types of activities shows up even more in the second
option. Management recognizes the difficulty in doing exploration and exploitation
simultaneously but takes the view that the best way to accomplish both is to develop an
“ambidextrous” organization (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004; Organization Science, 2009).
Here the company creates organizational units with a clear focus on either exploration or
exploitation, but rarely both. This type of organization is composed of “highly differentiated
but weakly integrated subunits. While the exploratory units are small and decentralized, with
loose cultures and processes, the exploitation units are larger and more centralized, with tight
cultures and processes” (Benner & Tushman, 2003: 52). The required integration takes place
largely at the leadership-team level, rather than being left to mid-level managers, since “the
pressures on core business managers to meet current customer needs, optimize processes, and
meet short-term financial expectations make it almost impossible for them to fully engage in
exploring new opportunities at the same time” (Kates & Galbraith, 2007: 186).
The separation of the exploration-focused unit is often physical as well as organizational.
Lockheed’s own employees, for example, weren’t told the location of the company’s famed
“Skunk Works” aerospace development center in the early days. Similarly, Steve Jobs
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famously moved the original Macintosh computer development team at Apple to a separate
building and flew a pirate flag from the roof. The innovation-focused unit is kept away from
the “corporate antibodies” that often do not see enough potential early in development to free
up their own resources to support the new approach.
While this separation can protect innovation, it also makes the eventual required integration
tougher to achieve. Since the reporting structures, goals, metrics, and rewards of the separate
group may be very different, how do you build incentives and coordination mechanisms to
integrate the different units? Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center provides a cautionary tale.
PARC was located in California, far away from the corporate headquarters on the U.S. east
coast. And while the technologies invented at PARC – such as laser printing, Ethernet, the
graphical user interface, and the mouse – were critical to the technology industry, the fortunes
made from them went to firms other than Xerox. Thus, one of the biggest challenges of
ambidextrous organizations is how to leverage through exploitation what has been discovered
by exploration – while safeguarding against knowledge spillover to rivals.

Option 3: Cycle Back and Forth Between
Exploration and Exploitation
The third option acknowledges that it can be a challenge to have both exploration and
exploitation focused units in the same organization since these units will have different
incentives, structures, and time horizons. Similarly, organization theorists recognize
the benefits that arise from alignment around a singular focus. But since exploration or
exploitation alone risks the success and failure traps, the third option is to cycle between
these approaches. “Temporal cycling between long periods of exploitation and short bursts of
exploration… [has] been identified as an alternative balancing mechanism that may be both
logical and practical” (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006).
One of the most common areas of organization design where this shows up is in the
centralization versus decentralization debate (Nickerson & Zenger, 2002), where each
option offers benefits but a balance works best over time. The key idea “is that under certain
conditions managers modulate between or among discrete structures to approximate, albeit
temporarily, levels of functionality unachievable when organizations remain fixed with a
particular structure” (Nickerson & Zenger, 2002: 548). Since this type of change can be
disruptive and costly, scholars suggest that firms should pursue such a major change only
after “a critical state of incongruence with the environment is reached” (Miller, 1982: 133).
The challenge here is twofold. Such a major reorientation requires many changes in the
elements of organization design, such as structures, processes, coordination mechanisms, HR
policies, metrics, and rewards. So getting the organization realigned around a very different
approach is likely to be difficult. Second, for firms that reorient too regularly, employees
may see the changes as faddish, and choose to simply wait out any reorientation rather than
commit to it. Further, the need to reorient the firm when incongruence with the operating
environment has been reached assumes that key decision makers are capable of sensing,
evaluating, and responding to environmental signals.

Option 4: Continuous and Incremental
Reconfiguration
Since episodic and irregular change can be difficult to implement, the final option seeks to
make change ongoing and incremental. Rather than involving the entire firm, the organization
can adjust organizational units through continuous and incremental means. The idea here
is that the boundaries between organizational units are redrawn, resources redeployed, and
responsibilities reapportioned as needed. Eisenhardt and Brown (1999: 73) refer to this as
an adaptive process of “patching,” which is “…the adding, deleting, splitting, transferring
or combining chunks of businesses.” Beyond adaptation, the process of reconfiguring the
firm may also serve as a mechanism for purposeful experimentation and the search for new
opportunities (Karim, 2006).
This approach is the least well developed in the academic literature and thus the least
66

Timothy N. Carroll

Designing Organizations for
Exploration and Exploitation

well understood. It may be that this approach is a more frequent version of the third option
(cycling back and forth). It is also possible that the evolution of reconfiguration occurs in
one direction – from more exploration to more exploitation – as differentiated organizational
units follow a product life cycle (Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009). It can also
be that different divisions, based on the turbulence of their markets, can each incrementally
reconfigure to find the right balance between exploration and exploitation. Firms that patch
and reconfigure are constantly updating their business units such that a unit is “small enough
for agility and large enough for efficiency” (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1999: 74). A good example
is Nokia, as it seeks to improve efficiency in its mobile phone division that serves the majority
of developing markets, versus its mapping division that must remain flexible as it explores
new ways to offer location-based services to its smartphone users. Thus, this approach is
a more granular approach to the second option – exploration and exploitation may occur
simultaneously but to differing degrees within different divisions.
Continuous, incremental redesign may sound ideal. However, frequent reconfiguration of
organizational boundaries can be costly and not necessarily successful. Unit reconfiguration
announcements – where most units are reconfigured either to increase efficiency or to pursue
growth opportunities in new product markets – initially increase shareholder wealth but then
face a period of decline in earnings performance (Brickley & Van Drunen, 1990). Not only
may the processes (of redrawing, redeploying, and reconfiguring) be costly to accomplish,
but they also may be disruptive to the organization if not integrated seamlessly into the
existing structure. This is a micro version of the challenges associated with option one but
occurring within a single firm. Scholars have found that the art of frequent, incremental
reconfiguration is also something that must be learned over multiple experiences before
leading to subsequent innovations (Karim, 2009). Thus, firms that have limited resources for
reconfiguration may be dissuaded from this type of process.

Conclusion
Note that there is wide variety in the options discussed above. The first option takes the
view that maintaining a balance within the same organization is close to impossible. The last
option holds that it is not only possible but advisable to try to do both. The other two options
are somewhere in the middle. The lack of consensus reflects the significant challenge that
exploration and exploitation present for any organization.
Following contingency logic, the right choice of organization design always “depends”
– on features of the organization, its strategy, its operating environment, and so on (Burton,
DeSanctis, & Obel, 2006). Thus, factors both internal and external to the firm should guide the
choice of option. After all, an organization with little experience in selecting and managing
alliance partners would likely have a difficult time taking the first approach. Likewise, the
capabilities related to managing ongoing organizational change would be critical to the last
approach. While each of the options has its challenges, not recognizing and attempting to
deal with the fundamental challenge of doing both exploration and exploitation would be the
worst response.
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